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Exposure to Influenza Virus Aerosols in the Hospital Setting: Is 
Routine Patient Care an Aerosol Generating Procedure?
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We read with interest the article by Bischoff et al, in which they describe detection of 
influenza virus in aerosols around hospitalized patients with influenza virus infection who 
were receiving routine care [1]. As the authors note, current World Health Organization and 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention guidelines for protection of healthcare 
professionals from influenza virus infection rely on the supposition that, under routine 
conditions, most transmission occurs via large droplets, rather than via small-particle 
aerosols [2, 3]. Under these guidelines, aerosol transmission is presumed to be limited to 
certain aerosol-generating procedures (AGPs), for which higher-level respiratory protection 
is recommended. The designation of AGPs has been made in large part by extrapolation 
from epidemiologic studies of outbreaks of other respiratory infections, such as tuberculosis 
and SARS coronavirus infection [4]. Whether such procedures are uniquely associated with 
generation of potentially infectious aerosols has not been established.
As part of a pilot study, we recently enrolled patients with and those without respiratory 
infections who were undergoing potential AGPs at a tertiary-care hospital. All patients 
provided written informed consent. We included patients with documented influenza virus 
infection during periods when they were undergoing mechanical ventilation and/or during 
periods when they were breathing on their own. We sampled air within 0.91 m (3 feet) and 
1.83 m (6 feet) of the patient and outside the room for 3.25 hours, using National Institute 
for Occupational Safety and Health 2-stage aerosol samplers [5]. Aerosol sampling was also 
performed for 1 to several minutes near the patient’s mouth, using closed-faced filter 
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cassettes during extubation, suctioning, and use of an incentive spirometer. Influenza virus 
RNA copy number was determined by polymerase chain reaction (PCR), and the mean 
value of 2 replicates was used in analysis.
Variability in influenza virus RNA–laden aerosol generation was evident. The experience of 
one patient with influenza diagnosed on hospital day 1 by PCR of bronchoalveolar lavage 
fluid is informative (Table 1). On hospital day 2, we obtained samples while the patient was 
breathing with the assistance of a mechanical ventilator. On hospital day 3, we obtained 
samples during extubation and subsequently while the patient was breathing on his own. On 
hospital day 4, we again obtained samples while the patient was breathing on his own. On 
each day, influenza virus RNA was detected in particles of respirable size, but a relationship 
to what we considered to be potential AGPs (mechanical ventilation, suctioning, extubation, 
and use of an incentive spirometer) was not evident. Indeed, potential respiratory exposures 
to healthcare professionals in the room appeared highest on hospital day 4, when the patient 
was breathing on his own and care was routine. Interestingly, the highest concentration of 
influenza virus RNA copies observed during these 3 days of sampling occurred on hospital 
day 3, outside of the patient’s room. Although genetic comparison to the patient’s virus was 
not performed, the pattern suggested a source of influenza virus other than the patient and 
underscored the challenges of studying and controlling influenza virus transmission in the 
hospital setting.
Bischoff et al found that the majority of influenza virus RNA was contained in small 
particles. This observation corroborates previous work [5–7] and raises the possibility that 
aerosol transmission of influenza virus may occur during routine patient care [8]. Looking 
forward, by better characterizing the risk of infection when influenza virus–laden aerosols 
are generated, such as verifying the infectivity of virus found in small particles and/or 
demonstrating an increased risk of influenza virus infection among healthcare professionals 
due to small particle aerosols, future studies may prompt a reconsideration of current 
guidelines for protecting such individuals from influenza virus infection. Yet as our 
experience suggests, multiple sources of influenza virus are possible in healthcare settings, 
and some of these sources (whether they are patients, fellow healthcare workers, or visitors 
with undiagnosed infection) will go unrecognized. Thus, use of preventive measures that do 
not require source recognition, such as vaccination, will remain of paramount importance.
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Table 1
Results of Air Sampling Near a Patient With Influenza
Sampler Location, Height, Stage
Influenza A Virus Load, Copies/m3 of Air
Hospital Day 2 Hospital Day 3 Hospital Day 4
Head of beda
 1.52 m
  First (>4 μm) Not detected Not detected 826
  Second (1–4 μm) 216 Not detected 983
  Filter (<1 μm) Not detected 112 Not detected
   Total respirable (<4 μm) 216 112 983
 1.02 m
  First (>4 μm) Not detected Not detected Not detected
  Second (1–4 μm) 414 Not detected Not detected
  Filter (<1 μm) Not detected Not detected Not detected
   Total respirable (<4 μm) 414 Not detected Not detected
Right of bed (1.83 m from patient)
 1.52 m
  First (>4 μm) 32 770 Not detected 26
  Second (1–4 μm) Not detected Not detected 29 887
  Filter (<1 μm) Not detected Not detected Not detected
   Total respirable (<4 μm) Not detected Not detected 29 887
 1.02 m
  First (>4 μm) Not detected Not detected Not detected
  Second (1–4 μm) Not detected Not detected 2085
  Filter (<1 μm) Not detected Not detected Not detected
   Total respirable (<4 μm) Not detected Not detected 2085
Outside room
 1.52 m
  First (>4 μm) Not detected Not detected Not detected
  Second (1–4 μm) Not detected 3844 44
  Filter (<1 μm) Not detected Not detected Not detected
   Total respirable (<4 μm) Not detected 3844 44
 1.02 m
  First (>4 μm) Not detected Not detected Not detected
  Second (1–4 μm) Not detected 329 152 141
  Filter (<1 μm) Not detected Not detected 53
   Total respirable (<4 μm) Not detected 329 152 194
Near patient mouth during suctioning
 0 m
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Sampler Location, Height, Stage
Influenza A Virus Load, Copies/m3 of Air
Hospital Day 2 Hospital Day 3 Hospital Day 4
  Filter Not detected Not done Not done
Near patient mouth during extubation
 0 m
  Filter Not done Not detected Not done
Near patient mouth during spirometer use
 0 m
  Filter Not done 2913 Not done
On hospital day 2, patient was breathing with the assistance of a mechanical ventilator. On hospital days 3 and 4, patient was breathing on his own. 
The lower limits of detection and quantification by quantitative polymerase chain reaction were 10 and 15 copies, respectively.
a
The sampler was located behind the patient’s head. This location was chosen to limit interference with clinical activities, but it may have 
contributed to the relatively low number of influenza A virus copies in the larger stage (≥4 μm).
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